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Abstract. Schumpeter’s and Hayek’s view of market coordination as being not about 
efficiency, but about endogenous change and never-ending discovery has been 
increasingly recognized even by the mainstream of economics. Underlying this view is 
the notion of creative learning agents who bring about novelty. We argue that apart from 
the challenges it poses for positive theorizing, novelty (be it technological, institutional or 
commercial) also has a complex normative dimension that standard welfare economics is 
unsuited to deal with. We show that welfare economics has to be reconstructed on the 
basis of evolutionary-naturalistic insights into the way human agents bring about, value 
and respond to novelty-induced change. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What’s the point of letting the market coordinate economic activities? This question can 
be answered in two radically different ways. While the neoclassical mainstream of 
economics points towards the market’s capacity to yield maximum allocative efficiency, 
heterodox economists rather focus on Schumpeterian and Hayekian ideas about the 
market’s role in fostering change and innovation and in processing valuable knowledge. 
The underlying conceptions of “welfare” diverge just as much as the corresponding 
positive visions of the economy. In an evolutionary perspective, capitalism should be 
understood and appreciated as a restless “engine of growth” (Nelson 1990) rather than as 
a mechanism to generate stable equilibria by having rational agents economize on scarce 
resources. 
It may be argued that the evolutionary view of the market and its merits is able to 
reflect the reality of modern capitalism and its awe-inspiring capacity to revolutionize our 
way of life much better than the textbook models of mainstream, neoclassical economics. 
The processes underlying the generation and diffusion of commercial, technological or 
institutional novelty have been and continue to be successfully explored using modeling 
techniques inspired by the evolutionary approach (for surveys, see Nelson 1995; Witt 
2008). There is, however, still a major asymmetry between the evolutionary and the 
neoclassical view, in that only the latter is presently able to consistently evaluate what the 
market brings about. Lacking any independent elaborate notion of “welfare”, 
evolutionary approaches remain silent in this regard. As a consequence, any scientifically 
informed critical discussion about goals and criteria of policy-making has to be left either 
to the policy-makers themselves or to the neoclassical economists. At the same time, the 
latters’ normative ideas and ideals (such as, most prominently, the notions of Pareto 
efficiency and “market failure”) are intuitively rejected by most evolutionary scholars 
interested in these matters, mainly due to the fact that they are tailored to the conditions 
of a static perfect-information world (Metcalfe 2001; Hodgson 1999).1  
Hence, evolutionary economists are stuck in a dilemma: They may rightly claim 
to better positively understand what’s going on in the market economy, and they may 
even rightly sense to have a better intuition about when things go wrong there, but as yet 
                                                 
1 see also Hayek (1948: 92-106) for an early forceful critique. 
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they do not have the (conceptual and theoretical) tools to back this intuition, i.e., to 
generate independent, well-justified policy advice. 
One may object that there is, within the Evolutionary Economics field, a large 
literature concerned with practical advice related to, e.g., innovation or entrepreneurship 
policy, and this is certainly true.2 A closer look reveals, though, that this literature is 
mostly concerned with what John Neville Keynes (John Maynard’s father), in his “Scope 
and Method of Political Economy” (Keynes 1917), dubbed the “art of political 
economy”, namely, the branch of instrumental economics which starts from some given 
policy goal and examines the most effective tools and means to realize it. In this respect, 
instrumental Evolutionary Economics tends to start from the (often implicit and rather 
broad) presumptions, (i) that policy is in fact able to influence intensity and direction of 
innovative activities, and (ii) that, given this capacity, it should foster novelty, learning, 
variety and innovation-induced growth in an economy. What is lacking, then, is an 
examination of questions such as  
- Is it necessarily a good thing to (unconditionally) foster innovation? 
- Is structural change desirable per se – the more so, the faster it proceeds?  
- How should novelty-induced costs and benefits be weighed? 
- How can we define and measure “social welfare” in an evolutionary setting 
(where, e.g., individual preferences evolve as well)? 
So far, hardly anything has been done to move beyond the purely instrumental analysis of 
policy-making. This has two key consequences. On the one hand, policy statements by 
evolutionary economists tend to remain somewhat incomplete and superficial. On the 
other hand, scholars who dismiss orthodox criteria such as Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency on the grounds of, e.g., their static nature cannot easily support their critique 
by referring to some alternative set of criteria that are superior in some important respect, 
such as being consistently applicable to social phenomena in an evolving economy. This 
second issue relates to the potential which an evolutionary theory of welfare could have 
for enriching welfare economics itself. Given the increasingly abstract character and 
narrow informational basis of the latter, its own practical relevance has been questioned 
from very different angles (Sen 1977; Sen 1996; Atkinson 2001; Ng 2003; Scanlon 
                                                 
2 see, e.g., Metcalfe (2005), Audretsch et al. (2007). 
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1991). Some of these angles look familiar to evolutionary economists: For instance, the 
problem of how to deal with preference change while sticking to a preference-based 
notion of welfare is increasingly discussed (Weizsäcker 2005; Sugden 2004).3 
Consequently, welfare economics’ main theorems and results are not only questioned by 
most evolutionary economists due to their static nature, but they prove to be more or less 
irrelevant in the context of many practical normative issues which turn out to be most 
interesting for contemporary economists in general: Examples include questions about 
how to evaluate government interference in processes of social norm or preference 
formation, based on the purposeful manipulation of framing effects (“Libertarian 
Paternalism”) or the regulation of “social meaning” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003a, 2003b; 
Lessig 1995).  
Thus, we argue that Evolutionary Economics should finally start investigating the 
normative implications of its positive insights, by elaborating upon an evolutionary 
welfare economics (henceforth EWE). Intuitively, an evolutionary perspective should not 
only make a difference in terms of how to do positive research in economics, but also in 
terms of welfare-related issues. As Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter already pointed 
out in their “Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” (1982)4, “it is apparent that an 
evolutionary view of what is going on in the world of firms and industries strongly 
influences how one looks at the question of what should be going on”, leading them to 
conclude that such a view would require a “rethinking of normative economics” (ibid.: 
356). Put differently, in light of what they know about economic behavior and social 
phenomena, evolutionary economists should develop their own ideas about what goals 
and criteria ought to guide economic policy-making, how these could be justified, 
weighed against each other, and operationalized. Moreover, the way these issues are 
analyzed should be based on background assumptions that are compatible with those 
guiding positive research in Evolutionary Economics. 
 The present paper aims at suggesting a way to construct an EWE. A conceptual 
framework is presented that clarifies in which sense positive insights from Evolutionary 
Economics may play a role in generating welfare judgments and developing policy 
advice. The argument is built around two key hypotheses. The first one is 
                                                 
3 classical treatments include v.Weizsäcker (1971) and Elster (1982). 
4 italics in the original. 
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methodological: We argue that evolutionary economics does have the conceptual and 
theoretical resources to develop an EWE which could then guide, within a framework 
inspired by Constitutional Economics thinking, the critical reflection and exploration of 
the complex normative dimension of innovation. More precisely, these resources can be 
located in the naturalistic underpinnings of the model of human behavior that is used in 
the field (Witt 1991; Binder 2008). This model has important implications for our 
understanding of what determines human welfare. Thus, the behavioral foundations of 
such a theory of welfare will be much more empirically informed than is the case in the 
orthodox approach. The second hypothesis is of a normative nature: We show that 
normative reasoning on the basis of an evolutionary conception of the economy leads to 
two conflicting views on the nature of welfare: Welfare can either consist directly in what 
individuals value or desire (Vanberg 1994; Kerstenetzky 2007) or it can consist in the 
smooth working of the economic system itself, seen from a supra-individual perspective. 
In our case, this smooth working would amount to the capacity of the evolving economy 
to process dispersed knowledge, bring about variety, facilitate learning and foster 
change5. Since the individualistic and the systemic view are hard to reconcile, much of 
the justificatory ground-work within an EWE will presumably concern striking a balance 
between them. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the key ideas that can be 
found in the literature on the normative implications of Evolutionary Economics. Based 
on a significant gap we will identify there, section 3 lays the conceptual groundwork for 
an evolutionary approach to welfare. Section 4 focuses on the implications of the 
phenomenon of preference change as the key issue that distinguishes the evolutionary 
approach to welfare from Paretian accounts. Section 5 briefly discusses some possible 
applications and discusses the problem of the conflicting individualistic and systemic 
interpretations of welfare, and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 this seems to be Potts’ (2004) background assumption. See also section 5, below. 
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2. The evolutionary viewpoint 
When evolutionary economists reason about the political and in particular the normative 
implications of their research agenda, there are two issues finding almost general 
agreement. First, most scholars in the field concur in that the key concepts of orthodox 
welfare economics cannot be used to evaluate phenomena that emerge in an evolving 
economy. Second, there is widespread agreement that any reasoning about policy or 
welfare implications has to come to terms with the problem of genuine uncertainty that 
characterizes any complex, endogenously evolving economy. Let’s have a closer look at 
these two issues. 
 Mainstream economics is, to paraphrase Robbins (1935: 16), about how rational 
agents economize on a given set of scarce resources. When put this way, the economic 
problem has a straightforward normative solution: optimality is reached as soon as the 
economizing has been done in extremis, with all resources being allocated in an efficient 
and stable equilibrium. According to the first theorem of Welfare Economics, this state of 
minimal waste is realized under conditions of friction-less perfect competition. The 
positive and the normative perspective are closely linked, for the Robbinsian approach to 
frame the problem of economic life has a latently normative flavor (Witt 2004): 
Economizing on scarce resources is seen as inherently desirable. Hence, the 
conceptualization of the kind of issues economics should deal with already presupposes a 
quite narrow set of possible welfare criteria, viz., the criteria of Paretian efficiency. 
 What about the evolutionary way to frame the economic problem? The literature 
focusing on the conceptual basis of Evolutionary Economics (Nelson 1995; Witt 2008) 
rejects the Robbinsian conception in favor of a more complex view: Economics is 
understood as being about the way heterogeneous, boundedly rational and creatively 
learning agents bring about novelty and change at all levels of economic life. For logical 
reasons, novelty-induced change tends to be surprising and unsettling. Stable equilibria, 
should they ever appear, seem to be uninteresting, both in a positive and in a normative 
sense. As Hayek (1945: 523) put it, “economic problems arise always and only in 
consequence of change”.6 Individuals experiment and learn in a time-consuming (and 
necessarily “wasteful”) process which involves their acquiring new preferences, and 
                                                 
6 See also Hayek (1948: 101): “[A]ll economic problems are created by unforeseen changes which require 
adaptation“.  
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which leads to the creation of interaction- and coordination-based order rather than 
equilibrium. Order should be understood in a procedural rather than in a static sense.  
Clearly, there is no place for an argument analogous to the mainstream in extremis 
reasoning here, for there is no “naturally” evolving order per se. Rather, the order’s 
properties depend crucially on the nature of its institutional framework. Given such a 
framework, the resulting order can have desirable and undesirable characteristics − this 
has to be found out on the basis of some independently construed welfare criterion 
(Vanberg 1994; Buchanan 1977). Thus, this way to frame the economic problem avoids 
at least the stark normative connotations of the Robbinsian approach. At this conceptual 
level, the one thing that can be said is that normative issues potentially arise whenever 
change happens. There is no perfectly stable and perfectly desirable state of optimality 
that could conceivably ever be reached. Rather, adopting an evolutionary view leads to 
the suggestion to focus on the question which institutional arrangements are suited to deal 
with change-induced societal problems, with the standard underlying the meaning of 
“better” to be defined in an independent way.7 
 Hence, from an evolutionary perspective on the economy the actual definition of 
social welfare does not have to be prespecified in a narrow way. The only thing that 
seems to be excluded at this point is the identification of social welfare with static 
Paretian efficiency. On the other hand, given its well-developed repository of empirically 
backed insights into the determinants of economic behavior and the working properties of 
institutions, Evolutionary Economics allows to derive a rich set of “policy implications” 
on the instrumental level. These tend to have a specifically evolutionary flavor. For given 
any pre-assumed policy goal, possible and effective ways to reach that goal depend 
strongly on whether a neoclassical or an evolutionary model of the economy (with its 
specific epistemic conditions) is assumed to apply in the background. 
 Thus, it is hardly surprising that most evolutionary economists, when examining 
policy- and welfare-related issues, have remained almost exclusively on the instrumental 
level. There, one aspect has caught most attention: In a complex, evolving market 
                                                 
7 We assume that this is what Nelson and Winter (1982: 357) have in mind when speculating that “a 
normative theory consistent with an evolutionary approach to positive theory almost certainly will be 
complex and messy. It is unlikely that one will be able to prove many sweeping normative theorems of the 
sort that are now contained in our advanced treatises and elementary texts. This, however, should not cause 
despair.” 
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environment, most policy measures generate indirect or long-term side effects (Pelikan 
2002). These side effects are sometimes perverse, often surprising, and always hard to 
track. This is due to the fact there will virtually always be agents who are negatively 
affected by a given policy measure. Reacting to policy-induced losses in terms of their 
wealth or, more generally, their subjective utility, these agents will try to find creative − 
and, hence, unpredictable − ways to at least partially circumvent these effects (Wegner 
1997). The history of economics certainly provides ample evidence for such a dynamic 
interplay between policy-makers’ moves and economic agents’ countermoves. 
 Given this problem of “creative responses” and the ensuing harsh epistemic 
conditions of policy-making on the one hand, and on the other hand the indeterminacy 
with respect to the conceptualization the “common good” that should guide policy-
making, most scholars in applied Evolutionary Economics have reacted in one of the 
following two ways. 
- The first option is to leave the precise meaning of “welfare” somewhat open 
(open, that is, beyond the usual rejection of orthodox conceptions). It may then be 
defined in a pragmatic or eclectic way as including usual goals such as “growth”, 
“economic development” or “output”. Dolfsma (2005) would be an example of 
this approach. Schumpeter himself may also be classified here8, as well as many 
scholars engaged in applied Evolutionary Economics who resort to “historical 
standards”. Foss (2006) aptly describes this strategy: “Identify a historical success 
story (Finland in the 1990s?), and let the qualities that characterize this success 
story become the relevant standard.”  
- The second option would be to look out for a dynamic welfare criterion. On the 
most basic level, this then amounts to equating social welfare with “innovation” 
or “learning”: Policy should aim at establishing conditions that encourage 
innovative behavior and foster learning on all levels of the economy (Hodgson 
1999: ch. 11). In the words of Metcalfe (2001: 561f.), the economic process 
should be evaluated according to how far it succeeds in “overcoming ignorance”. 
This, he argues, is a standard that would be more “exacting” than the conventional 
                                                 
8 see his suggestion in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” that “we shall call that system relatively 
more efficient which we see reason to expect would in the long run produce the larger stream of 
consumers’ goods per equal unit of time” (Schumpeter 1942: 190, italics omitted) and the fact that here and 
in related work he never really elaborates upon this notion of efficiency or welfare. 
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criteria of welfare economics. Views like these seem to reflect an older idea 
developed by Douglass North (1990) in the context of his normative analysis of 
institutional arrangements: In a dynamic economy, he argues, social states should 
be judged according to their “adaptive efficiency”, a criterion which he defines, 
somewhat vaguely, as being “concerned with the willingness of a society to 
acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and 
creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the 
society through time” (ibid.: 80). Although the concept has been much cited ever 
since, it has never really been systematically elaborated upon as an element of an 
evolutionary approach to normative economic theorizing. 
Thus, it seems that evolutionary economists, when moving beyond the purely 
instrumental level of analysis and beyond mere normative eclecticism, tend to equate 
“welfare” with “innovation”. This, however, means that they effectively fall back to a 
kind of reasoning that we have already identified as being characteristic for the 
mainstream approach to social welfare: Assume that economic life is about X 
(“economizing on scarce resources”, say), then it is desirable to have more rather than 
less of X, and then policy should aim at fostering X, until an optimum state of “perfect 
X” will eventually be reached. Quite analogously, one might argue, that when economic 
life is instead actually about Y (“learning and change”), then policy should aim at 
fostering Y as much as possible. But can an optimum of “perfect Y” conceivably be 
reached? This seems to be implausible, for two reasons: First, while in the mainstream 
view, “economizing on scarce resources” has an in-built “optimum” limit, due of course 
to the assumptions of given resources and given preferences, in the evolutionary 
perspective “learning and change” does not have such a limit: Learning goes on 
infinitely, without ever reaching an end. Second, there is no “natural” learning-induced 
order without any institutional framework. Hence, any normative judgment about the 
order has to depend on and refer to the framework, i.e., to something external to the order 
itself.  
 Having established the need for some external benchmark, it may be questioned 
whether most people would really prefer to live in a world where welfare is equated with 
“learning and change” and nothing else. To this question we turn now. 
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3. A problem of justice 
Does it make sense to conceptualize welfare as being about “innovation” or “learning” or 
“change” tout court? While shying away from any systematic elaboration of the 
normative dimension of the “gales of creative destruction”, Joseph Schumpeter (1912)9 
proved to have at least a clear intuitive grasp of the complexities involved by processes of 
innovation-induced growth:  
“[A] process of degeneration, of degradation of large circles (of society) 
accompanies the upward movement... Large circles see their economic basis being 
pulled away. This does not happen abruptly, but gradually. Through generations, 
the people affected live a deprived existence full of hopelessness. Their moral and 
intellectual powers dwindle, the more so the more the economic atmosphere they 
find themselves in is darkening. 
An observer from outer space wouldn’t notice these phenomena, so fascinating is 
the development at large – and those losses are just their reverse. They are due to 
the fact that the services these agents offered are now being offered in a better 
way. Even the suffering thus caused serves to get rid of the obsolete and to impel 
novelty. Those who are playing the drama, however, as well as those observers 
close to them, think differently about it. They cannot ignore the shouting of the 
crunched who are crushed down by the wheels of novelty.” 
Evolutionary change systematically involves winners and losers (Witt 1996). Winners 
may outweigh losers, losses may be “short-term”, costs and benefits may accrue to the 
same or to different people over time – everything is possible. But an evolutionary theory 
of welfare would have to give a well-justified answer to the question how gains and 
losses should be weighed, whether losers should be compensated, and whether gains 
through innovation are worth pursuing. 
 First of all, we have to examine the ambivalent nature of evolutionary economic 
change in more detail. A closer look at the underlying process of social learning reveals 
that equating welfare and innovation misses something that is not only essential as a 
positive explanandum, but also in terms of its normative relevance. As Metcalfe (2001: 
24) puts it, “progress in knowledge is necessarily non-uniform”.10 For economically 
relevant knowledge is always prone to be falsified and become obsolete when 
circumstances change. In an economy that operates outside a state of equilibrium, there 
are at all times “internally generated reasons for beliefs to change” (ibid.). With the 
epistemic basis of economic behavior in permanent turmoil, though, it follows that 
                                                 
9 my translation from the German original. 
10 italics added. 
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economic change itself necessarily proceeds in an uneven way: As Metcalfe (2001: 565f.) 
puts it, “advance in some directions is associated with deterioration in others”, even 
inevitably so: „Creative destruction implies the destruction of some activities as a 
necessary element in the growth of others“ (ibid.). 
Apart from its unquestionable beneficial impact on human welfare (however 
broadly defined), human innovativeness typically also involves risks and potentially 
severe detrimental consequences (Witt 1996; Witt 2003)11. New products, services, 
institutional arrangements or organizational schemes may make alternative “problem 
solutions” and their underlying knowledge obsolete. The costs incurred may be reflected 
in changes in the relative price vector (“pecuniary externalities”) or not (“technological 
externalities”). These detrimental consequences are directly linked to the way knowledge 
itself develops: society’s knowledge base may develop in such a way that, for instance, 
large stocks of “human capital” lose their market value; the diffusion of productive 
knowledge on how to cope with detrimental spillovers may be hampered; knowledge on 
ways to organize markets may develop, although people do not value it positively.12  
This problem of valuation points toward an important distinction between two 
kinds of knowledge that may or may not develop harmoniously. Put in general terms, 
positive or instrumental knowledge may develop in one direction while “normative 
knowledge” (i.e., people’s knowledge about their own personal preferences, values and 
goals) may develop in a quite different direction. Consequently, society’s knowledge 
base, i.e. its repository of problem solutions, would then no longer correspond to the 
actual “demand” for problem solutions.  
Given the uneven nature of economic evolution, it appears now that what is 
missing in the Evolutionary Economics literature on normative issues is the recognition 
that when observing and studying processes of “creative destruction”, we are facing a 
problem of justice. We cannot do without a concept of justice when questions about how 
to deal with trade-offs between novelty-induced gains and losses have to be solved. This 
holds independently of whether gains and losses accrue within one period or are spread 
over several time periods: Typically, novelty-induced destruction is imminent, while 
                                                 
11 cf. Buchanan’s (1977: 27-30) hint at the possibility of “spontaneous disorder”. 
12 Controversial market products such as genetically modified food or „markets“ for human organs may 
serve to illustrate this, as may, on the other hand, the market’s capacity to provide “green products” in a 
way that can be argued to increase social welfare, broadly understood (see section 4, below). 
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gains are realized in subsequent periods. Note the generality of the notion of justice that 
is required here: Within the large set of conceivable answers to the trade-off question, the 
typical quasi-utilitarian welfare economics position with its purely quantitative calculus 
in terms of novelty-induced benefits and novelty-induced costs qualifies as one option 
only.13 
Hence, “justice” should be understood in the most encompassing way. At the 
most abstract level, any concept of justice comprises (i) a notion of welfare as the 
“currency” which is used in the justice calculus, and (ii) a rule about how to weigh the 
different welfare entries on both sides of the balance sheet. Applying a criterion of justice 
involves the assessment of relative well-being among individuals affected by a certain 
social state, social process or policy intervention. 
As a normative concept, “justice” comprises both procedural as well as 
distributive criteria, i.e. criteria pertaining both to the (non-arbitrary) way rights and 
duties are allocated and procedures enforced as well as criteria concerning the distributive 
patterns brought about by market forces and policy interventions. Concerning the 
distributive dimension, we know as an empirical fact that novelty-induced change 
benefits the average individual. But if this means that it makes some agents win and 
others lose today, or if it makes some lose today and some or even (nearly) all win 
tomorrow (where “tomorrow” may mean “a few decades from now”), it is evident that 
some difficult trade-offs have to be solved when balancing these effects, that any solution 
found needs to be justified somehow, and that any justification needs to be based on some 
normative theory of justice, necessarily involving a theory of human welfare.  
Hence, moving beyond the pure instrumental level of analysis leads us to the 
desideratum of a concept of justice that should tell us under which conditions the 
phenomena accompanying evolutionary economic development can be seen as “just” and 
legitimate. It may be legitimate to encourage learning and foster innovation that generates 
serious hardship for a subset of the affected population, but it is not necessarily so. 
Rather, this evaluation depends on a normative analysis involving a justice “calculus” 
that in turn critically hinges on a conception of welfare (as the “currency” of justice). 
                                                 
13 A Rawlsian approach („inequality of winners and losers is just as long as losers are better off in the 
regime allowing the inequality than in a regime disallowing it”) would be an alternative candidate, see 
Rawls (1971: ch. 2). 
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To be sure, this concept of justice and its related criteria have to be used within 
the context of an endogenously evolving economy with its harsh epistemic conditions. 
This is difficult, but not outright impossible. Adopting the contractarian toolbox of 
Constitutional Economics (Buchanan 1977; Vanberg 1994; Vanberg 2006), we will argue 
that a concept of justice that serves our purposes can in fact be construed under the three 
following conditions. First, given the genuine uncertainty prevailing in an evolving 
economy, it should be tailored to the normative analysis of (constitutional) rules that 
generate observable patterns of outcomes rather than specific allocative and distributive 
states. Any normative perspective that starts from an evolutionary world-view has to be 
process-oriented in the sense that “rather than seeking to control outcomes directly, it 
seeks to affect outcomes indirectly, by subjecting the processes from which outcomes 
emerge to general rules that promise to generate overall desirable patterns of outcomes” 
(Vanberg 2006: 204).  
Second, the concept of justice should be embedded in an overarching principle 
and criterion of “general consensus”, stating that those rules are “just” that are generally 
agreed upon by the individuals affected by them. “Consensus” would replace “social 
welfare maximization” here, because the latter presupposes a specific and probably 
implausible solution of the trade-off between gains and losses: In the process of 
maximizing something, (positive) gains and (negative) losses would simply be seen as 
quantitative variables to be added up and offset interpersonally. In order to avoid such a 
narrow pre-specification, we suggest to resort to general consensus as a more general 
benchmark of legitimacy. Among all conceivable normative criteria, this is the one 
requiring the weakest prior value judgments: It is derived from the basic principle of 
Normative Individualism, according to which it is only actual current real-world 
preferences (and consent) that carry genuine legitimizing force (Vanberg 2006). Thus, 
“just” will be understood in the light of a general consensus criterion in the following, 
meaning that some balance of gains and losses is just insofar as it can plausibly (with 
good reasons) be taken to be generally acceptable.  
Third and most importantly, under the conditions of an evolving economy with 
evolving preferences, such a consensus criterion cannot be made operational without at 
least a minimum specification of the processes driving the formation of individual 
preferences (which constitute the consensus or the “social contract”). It is at this point 
13
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where the evolutionary theory of human welfare steps in. This issue will be examined in 
more detail in the following. 
 
4. How to track a moving consensus 
Concluding what has been said so far, we can state that the results and side effects of 
endogenous economic change can be classified as “legitimate” insofar as they emerge 
under rules that in turn can plausibly be judged acceptable by all individuals affected. 
This means that they can be seen as conforming to the individuals’ common 
“constitutional interests”. This way to conceptualize the normative problem of 
Evolutionary Economics implies that we cannot stipulate a priori that the detrimental 
effects of “creative destruction” are somehow automatically or naturally compensated by 
the beneficial impact of economic novelty and learning. Rather, we have to examine in 
detail what kinds of losses and gains are involved and how they relate to the welfare of 
the individuals affected by them, in order to be able to make any meaningful statement 
about whether the resulting balance can be qualified as “just” in the sense it is understood 
here. Two questions have to be examined here: First, it has to be specified what is meant 
by “losses and gains”, i.e., which “welfare currency” or “currencies” should be used to 
express these variables. This is a normative task. Second, given the answer to the first 
question, the value of the variables has to be examined empirically. This is a task that 
goes beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 Note that the criterion of legitimacy suggested above has to be made operational 
under the difficult epistemological circumstances of an evolving economy. The key 
implication of this concerns the status of individual preferences and the corresponding 
difficulty in conceptualizing welfare (the yet-to-be-specified “currency” of our justice 
criterion). While preferences can conveniently be assumed to be fixed and “given” in the 
context of a static resource allocation game, we have to drop that assumption in the case 
of an economy that generates novelty from within. When confronted with a never-ending 
stream of new ideas, goods and services, individuals adapt their preferences and acquire 
new ones. To illustrate, imagine consumer Cecilia. In the light of newly emerging 
positive-instrumental knowledge about the characteristics of a new good (say, the 
capacity of a new kind of eco-friendly car to satisfy her preference for saving the 
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environment), Cecilia may acquire a new preference for this car which did not exist 
before. Hence, new positive-instrumental knowledge shapes the development of her 
normative (preference-related) knowledge. Imagine further that the introduction of the 
new car is due to incentives shaped by a new policy measure initiated by the government. 
Thus, a policy intervention would have influenced the development of Cecilia’s 
individual preferences, making the latter endogenous to the economic system. As a 
consequence, her preferences and the degree of their satisfaction no longer qualify as an 
independent external measuring rod for policy interventions – neglecting this implication 
would lead us into logical circularity problems.14 It seems that the notion of welfare has 
to be redefined. 
 From a traditional Constitutional Economics perspective, one may object at this 
point that while the satisfaction of a set of preferences that is “given” at any point in time 
does indeed no longer qualify as an adequate standard of welfare, this does not rule out a 
procedural criterion of preference development. Thus, the maximization of opportunities 
to form and satisfy any preference whatsoever may still be a plausible criterion and may 
in fact be the only one acceptable from an individualistic perspective. Put differently, 
while the manifold preferences individuals hold in a pluralistic society are irreducibly 
heterogeneous, at least everyone will agree that everyone would benefit from a 
constitutional regime that maximizes each agent’s set of opportunities to satisfy one’s 
preferences (Sugden 2008). This would then leave a constitutional system granting 
maximum individual freedom as the only legitimate outcome. 
 This view, though, does not stand empirical scrutiny. The development and 
satisfaction of any actual preferences, however contingent they may be, is not the only 
thing real-world individuals care about and value (Wegner 2008). According to all 
available empirical evidence on the content of policy-related preferences of real-world 
individuals, the liberal views of standard Constitutional Economics on the substance of 
the social contract are prima facie only shared by a minority of citizens15. According to 
basic principles of Normative Individualism the citizens are however also the exclusive 
principals of policy-making. Whatever they agree to is legitimate. Hence, there is an 
apparent gap between the substantive claims of Constitutional Economics and the 
                                                 
14 Penz (1986: ch. 6) is the locus classicus for this problem. 
15 see, for example, Vis and van Kersbergen (2007) and Boeri et al. (2001). See from a theoretical 
Constitutional Economics perspective Buchanan (2005). 
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requirements of Normative Individualism proper. It calls for abandoning the standard 
approach to conceptualize welfare and consensus on the basis of the satisfaction of 
preferences alone. 
 Hence, we face the need to redefine welfare. This can be done in at least four 
different ways. Welfare may be conceptualized as being about happiness or subjective 
well-being or “experienced utility” (Ng 2003; Kahneman et al. 1997). Apart from this and 
totally independent of any hedonic considerations, it may also be conceptualized as being 
about the satisfaction of underlying genetically determined or culturally learned wants 
(which serve as “inputs” into the process of preference formation, Witt 2001)16, about 
objectively measurable capabilities humans are supposed to strive for universally (Sen 
1996), or about partly measurable opportunities to learn and express one’s preferences, 
irrespective of their contingent nature (Sugden 2004; Sugden 2007). In any of these cases, 
preferences lose their traditional status as the exclusive measuring rod of welfare. Put 
differently, they now no longer play their traditional exclusive role as goals, but rather 
acquire an instrumental status: Preferences are to be seen as tools to, e.g., increase 
happiness. As such, they will be more or less effective17 and can be made the subject of 
critical reflection and deliberation. At the same time, the focus of normative analysis 
moves one step “beyond” preferences, i.e., toward the factors determining their formation 
and scope. Notice that these happen to be the factors that Evolutionary Economics, with 
its empirically informed (“naturalistic”) model of human behavior, is well-equipped to 
deal with (Witt 1991). 
 While we will not go into a detailed discussion of the four approaches suggested 
in the literature, notice that what is essential in the context of the present discussion is the 
fact that in the context of an evolving economy with evolving preferences, it seems to be 
problematic to stick to a uniform notion of welfare. Rather, in an evolutionary welfare 
economics perspective, things get multi-faceted and quite intricate: Welfare consists of 
several components which are not necessarily reducible to some underlying one-
dimensional “basic currency”: While, for instance, happiness may be quantified using 
                                                 
16 These wants differ from preferences in being non-comparative drives to engage in certain activities. 
Basic wants include the needs for food, water, sleep, warmth, sex, etc., but also psychological needs such as 
the need for cognitive arousal and the need to comply with social norms. See Witt (1991) and Witt (2001) 
for details. 
17 see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2007) on the human tenedency to mispredict the hedonic impact of consumer 
decisions. 
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hedonic measures that track a person’s experienced “pleasure”, the measurement of 
opportunities to act and learn proceeds along quite different lines. While of all 
conceivable components of welfare, four have received some attention in the recent 
literature on the constituents of a “good life” – namely, subjective well-being, want 
satisfaction, capability and opportunity – we should not even assume that there are not 
many more essential components out there in the real world to be discovered. 
 Hence, in the context of an evolving economy, the basic notion of our concept of 
consensus-related justice, viz., welfare, loses its precise uniform meaning. In particular, 
we cannot derive any hypotheses about what kind of rule is generally acceptable by 
referring to the actual observable preferences of the individuals. Rather, given the 
variable and contingent nature of individual preferences, we have to focus on the factors 
determining their formation. This step is quite significant, as it has two important 
implications.  
First and most obviously, it involves a major modification of the welfare 
economic analysis and a shift of attention towards the “naturalistic” factors underlying 
the formation of individual preferences. Thus, “consensus” cannot be identified on the 
basis of whatever the individuals happen to prefer at a given point in time. Rather, it has 
to be identified in light of what makes them prefer the things they prefer. Insights about 
the process of preference formation may then even clear the way for deriving basic 
material statements about universal features of human preferences.18 Methodologically, 
this step involves overcoming the pure subjectivism that characterizes most of traditional 
Constitutional Economics, where preferences tend to be taken at face value, without any 
further inquiry into the way they were formed. This subjectivism seems to be inadequate 
in the context of an evolving economy with evolving preferences. Rather, our analysis 
suggests to aim at a material specification of the “social contract”, given the background 
assumption that the corresponding consensus is not static, but evolves itself over time. 
Metaphorically, picturing people’s consensus as the sea’s surface pattern, when we stop 
assuming the sea to be unchanging, we will have to know a lot about underwater currents 
in order not to lose sight of the pattern itself. 
 The second main implication concerns the methodological status of the results of 
our normative analysis. Given that the notions of preference, welfare and consensus lose 
                                                 
18 see Witt (1991; 2001). 
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some of their precise contours, it gets more difficult to derive statements about what kind 
of rules (in a comparative institutional analysis) can be seen as legitimate (read: 
“generally acceptable”) and which kinds of rules do not qualify as such. Hence, it would 
seem to be necessary to “downgrade” the status of the results of the kind of normative 
analysis that has been sketched above. Statements about the legitimacy of alternative 
rules can only be of a conjectural nature. After having identified the effects of, say, some 
constitutional rule on the various determinants of individual preferences and welfare, it is 
as yet unclear exactly how this translates into an overarching result in terms of 
“agreement” or “consensus”. Thus, we are left with the option to develop hypothetical 
statements of the following form: “Given what we know about the way individual 
preferences are formed and welfare is determined, constitutional rule R should be 
acceptable to the individuals affected” – or, somewhat more precisely: 
“If it is the case that (i) the preferences of the members of society S are 
determined by factors F, and if it is the case that (ii) rule R has effect E on the 
economy and, hence, on F, then rule R should be able to command general 
agreement by the members of S”.19 
Notice that statements of this kind are falsifiable in the following “practical” sense: If the 
individuals addressed by the scientific observer in this way actually do agree with the 
statement (by deciding to vote for R, say), then it is not (yet) falsified. 
Due to its admittedly weak status, conjectural statements of the kind described 
above are to be understood as a mere proposition as to the content of a society’s “social 
contract”, i.e., as to the set of constitutional rules that we have reason to believe can find 
unanimous consent among the individuals affected. Let’s assume, for the sake of the 
argument, that there exists a structure of political decision processes that allows 
individual policy-related preferences to be translated into actual collective choices in an 
unbiased way.20 Then any hypothetical statement about the acceptability of some rule can 
be falsified by the individuals actually not supporting the corresponding policy measure 
                                                 
19 A statement of this kind differs from simpler hypothetical imperatives (HI) in the following sense: While 
ordinarily, a HI states the most effective means, given some pre-specified goal, the HI suggested here takes 
goals as a result of a societal consensus where knowledge on the processes working on the consensus is 
taken as given. In this sense, one might call this kind of statement an “extended hypothetical imperative”. 
20 Put differently, there are no principal-agent problems. This is a heroic assumption, to be sure, but given 
that principal-agent issues concern the instrumental dimension of policy-making, it is necessary in order to 
clarify our main normative argument. 
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unanimously. Hence, conclusions of normative reasoning cannot legitimize anything per 
se. In the way they are issued by economists, they only play a role as one among many 
different inputs into the ongoing process of public deliberation about the goals, criteria 
and concrete steps of policy-making (Witt 1992)21 
 
5. Applying the tools 
How can the abstract toolbox of Constitutional Economics, complemented by 
“naturalistic” insights into the factors determining processes of preference formation be 
put to use? The key tool that can be applied here is the thought experiment involving the 
“veil of ignorance” in the sense of Rawls (1971).  
Let’s imagine a group of heterogeneous individuals gathering, in their role as 
democratic principals, behind the veil of ignorance in order to agree on a social contract 
for an innovative welfare-creating market game. The assumptions about their 
informational endowment are, of course, crucial. Let them know that the market game 
itself will be played under conditions of ongoing novelty-induced endogenous change and 
Hayekian uncertainty. While they do not know their own personal future positions and 
interests, they do know, however, general facts about what it means to play an innovative 
market game, including the fact that novelty will necessarily induce benefits as well as 
costs, that the game cannot be played without incurring temporary imbalances in the 
social cost-benefit calculus, and the fact that their own preferences will systematically 
evolve due to learning in the course of the market game. 
From an evolutionary perspective, the way this familiar veil-of-ignorance 
argument is employed will differ significantly from the way it is used in mainstream 
Constitutional Economics. While the content of the agents’ preferences can obviously not 
be specified in any way that makes agreement outright impossible, an evolutionary-
naturalistic outlook allows at least to take a look inside the “black box” of human 
preferences and preference formation (Cordes and Schubert 2007). It does not make 
                                                 
21 on this, see also Broome (2000: 5): “Democracy has at least two departments. One department is decision 
making, and here democracy requires that the people’s preferences should prevail… Another department… 
is the forming of people’s preferences…Our preferences about complex matters depend on our beliefs, and 
democracy requires a process of discussion, debate and education, aimed at informing and improving 
people’s beliefs, and moving them nearer the truth… The role of economists in a democracy belongs in the 
second department, not the first… Economists should aim to influence preferences, not take preferences for 
granted.” 
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sense, for instance, to assume the agents to be ignorant about the fact that they have and 
will have (as human beings) a set of genetically hard-wired basic wants that motivates 
their behavior on a most fundamental level (Witt 2001). Moreover, they know that their 
own wants and preferences will change in the course of the post-constitutional market 
game. With respect to a corresponding assumption about their risk preferences, this can 
already be shown to have significant implications in terms of the policy recommendations 
of a veil of ignorance-argument (Witt and Schubert 2008). Behind the veil, it may also 
make sense to endow agents with general theoretical knowledge about the learning 
mechanisms involved. Insights into the naturalistic determinants of moral (justice-related) 
norms would be required as well.  
How, then, does the knowledge about the fact that their own future preferences 
will be malleable affect the individuals’ deliberation behind the veil of ignorance? Two 
aspects seem to be particularly striking. First, endowed with basic insights into the 
naturalistic determinants of their current and future preferences, the individuals can be 
assumed to perceive and judge them as instrumental rather than as intrinsically valuable. 
Thus, they will have a genuine interest in having sufficient opportunities to try out new 
preferences as to their effectiveness in, e.g., allowing the experience to have one’s wants 
satisfied or in delivering hedonic utility. Second, while at the constitutional stage, 
individuals will evaluate any rule or policy on the basis of their current preferences, the 
beliefs underlying these preferences will reasonably reflect “educated guesses” (Witt 
2003) about how their preferences will be affected by economic processes and policy 
interventions in the future. Thus, the assessment of indirect and long-term side effects of 
policy-making − a key token of evolutionary thinking on policy-making (see section 2, 
above) − will have to be complemented by hypotheses about the policy’s effects on 
individual preferences. It may, for instance, be asked whether a certain constitutional rule 
leaves room for policies that constrain the instrumental effectiveness of individual 
preferences. 
 In general, deliberating behind the “veil of ignorance” will reflect a much broader 
notion of welfare than is common in traditional Constitutional Economics. To illustrate, 
one of the substantive implications that a naturalistically informed veil-of-ignorance 
argument may have concerns the role of reciprocity in market exchange. As experiments 
involving the ultimatum game have indicated, individuals appear to be guided by certain 
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social norms about the way a mutually realized gain from trade should (at least: not) be 
divided. Although the laboratory observations reveal a certain degree of heterogeneity, it 
is evident that people care about the distributive dimension of market exchange acts 
(Güth and Kliemt 2008). Assume that a naturalistic account of morality would confirm 
and specify these intuitive insights in the sense that the “revealed” behavioral norms are 
based on a common disposition. Then one could conclude that real-world individuals 
understand and perceive market exchange as a reciprocal and, hence, genuinely social 
relationship (Bruni and Sugden 2008). Then, however, it may be conjectured that they 
also have a “constitutional interest” in rules that guarantee that gains from exchange are 
not distributed in a way deemed unfair in light of these underlying distributive norms.22 
This may hold particularly when the exchange is about novel goods and services whose 
characteristics are as yet largely unknown to the market participants.  
So far, the reconstruction of various aspects in the process of constitutional 
deliberation has remained within the confines of strictly individualistic principles, with 
individual principals reasoning about how constitutional regimes may affect their own 
personal welfare in the future. In an evolving economy, however, this question cannot be 
answered without considering certain characteristics of the economic system itself. For 
instance, the impact of a certain constitutional regime on the individual freedom to 
experiment with new goods and services crucially depends on its impact on the nature of 
the economic system itself, such as its conduciveness to experimentation, its internal 
communication cost structure, its ability to create and process decentralized knowledge, 
or its capacity to adapt smoothly to external change. Variables such as these are a key 
prerequisite for the generation of welfare in an evolving economy. From a normative 
point of view, however, this leads us directly back to the problem with which we started: 
A smoothly working highly dynamic “learning economy” may exhibit great features in 
itself, but at the same time imply serious hardship for some of the individuals who have 
to live with it. 
                                                 
22 cf. Bruni and Sugden (2008: 57): “If a market relationship is to be perceived as mutual assistance, the 
distribution of gains from trade must not deviate too far from whatever standards of fairness are recognized 
by the parties concerned”. 
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While a similar discrepancy is also relevant in Paretian welfare economics,23 the 
tension between the individualistic and the systemic view on welfare normative issues 
seems to be particularly troublesome in an evolutionary setting. As Sen (1993) 
speculates, the temptation to interpret welfare (and “progress” more general) through a 
systemic lens may be particularly tempting for economists inspired by a Darwinian 
perspective on the economy. Many evolutionary economists clearly belong to this 
category. The whole problem is maybe most visible in some of Hayek’s later 
contributions to the policy implications of an evolutionary world-view (Kerstenetzky 
2000, 2007). To be sure, Hayek at times conceded that policy should care about the 
individual well-being (broadly interpreted) of market participants24. In his later writings, 
however, he argued that, given the way processes of institutional evolution work, it 
would be meaningless to ask whether the individuals affected by them would ever agree 
to the results, since, given the way supra-individual processes of cultural evolution work, 
“in any case, our desires and wishes are largely irrelevant” (Hayek 1988: 134).25 Hence, 
welfare came to be detached from the level of individual benefits. Above all, Hayek cared 
about maintaining certain systemic qualities of the decentralized market system, where 
knowledge is being processed in such an ingenious way. Whether the individuals liked its 
impact on their personal well-being or not, these features had to be protected against any 
attempt to push centralization too far. 
 On a more applied level, Potts (2004) has recently stressed the importance of the 
systemic view on welfare in the context of a normative analysis of financial “bubbles”. 
Starting from the premise that bubbles are “natural features of an economic system, and 
natural mechanisms of economic growth and evolution”, he argues that they are 
“ultimately a sign of system health and vigour, not of decadence and decay” (ibid.: 16), 
and that policy should appreciate their beneficial effects: “Inside a bubble, the cost of 
experimentation, and therefore variety generation, is lowered and,… the process of 
structural change is accelerated… Learning is accelerated within a bubble, and radically 
                                                 
23 Albeit in a much simpler way: Even if the system as a whole reaches a point on the Pareto frontier, this 
does not imply that all individual members of the system find themselves in a “desirable” state. It only 
means that the system has exhausted all available gains from voluntary exchange. It does not imply 
anything about individually realized levels of welfare. Welfare Economics has reacted by complementing 
its toolbox with criteria such as “potential” Pareto efficiency or social welfare functionals, but these criteria 
have created conceptual and theoretical problems of their own. 
24 see, for instance, Hayek (1973: 65). 
25 on this, see also Vanberg (1994: 183), Gordon (1981). 
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new business ideas can get a start, as can radically new products” (ibid.: 18-19). His 
policy implications are straightforward: “Policy should not worry about bubbles; if 
anything, and where it is safe to do so, it should perhaps even encourage them.” (ibid.: 
20). 
 In light of recent events in global financial markets, this may sound absurd. Potts 
however has a point in stressing the systemic aspect of welfare: In order to establish the 
conditions necessary for an evolving economy to work smoothly, bubbles do have some 
functional properties. The argument gets into trouble, though, as soon as the normative 
and the instrumental level are mixed: Fast learning and variety generation would then be 
judged as desirable goals per se. Potts seems to be dimly aware of this risk of producing 
counter-intuitive policy advice (note his caveat: “where it is safe to do so”), but does not 
elaborate on this issue. 
 Welfare can either consist directly in what individuals value or desire (Vanberg 
1994; Kerstenetzky 2007) or it can consist in the smooth working of the economic system 
itself. From an individualistic point of view, the features conducive to a smoothly 
working system would rather be classified as instrumental variables that would have to be 
judged according to their contribution to individual well-being. In this sense, we suggest 
to follow Boulding (1981: 195) who emphasized the point that “from the human point of 
view, progress is improvement in the state of persons. Everything else is an intermediate 
good.”  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
As Nelson and Winter (1982: ch. 15) predict, an evolutionary approach to welfare will 
necessarily lack the uniform consistency of Paretian welfare economics. In particular, it 
will not serve to derive strictly provable theorems involving “optimal equilibria”, but 
rather help to engage in comparative institutional analysis on the basis of a multi-faceted 
(and probably multi-dimensional) notion of welfare. As Metcalfe (2001: 565) puts it, 
“one important consequence of the Darwinian theory was to banish the idea of perfection 
from the discussion of progress”. But even in its presently still quite abstract form, the 
evolutionary perspective on the normative issues raised by novelty has already important 
implications for several conceptual, but also practical policy-related questions. 
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 As the present paper has argued, Evolutionary Economics currently lacks but 
needs an approach to welfare that is compatible with its overall outlook on the economy 
and economic behavior. At the same time, it also possesses the key tools to construct such 
an approach, in particular by enriching the standard contractarian toolbox of 
Constitutional Economics with empirical insights into the factors determining human 
preferences. Finally, we have identified a tension between a strictly individualistic and a 
systemic interpretation of economic welfare which will certainly make for an interesting 
challenge for any future contributions to evolutionary welfare economics.  
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